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1. INTRODUCTION
Since Fargo Bank launched the first index fund in the 1970s (Sharpe 2007), we have seen a
growing popularity of index funds. According to Cremers, Ferreira, Matos and Starks (2011),
“Nearly 28,000 equity funds and $10.5 trillion in assets under management were recorded as of
December 2010 (Investment Company Institute (2011)). The percentage invested in explicitly
indexed funds has grown rapidly over the last decade from about 14% of assets under manage-
ment in 2002 to about 22% in 2010.” Moreover, apart from the explicitly indexed funds, there
are also closet index funds, which claim to practice active management, but stay close to the
benchmark index. Petajisto (2013) shows that out of 1,124 mutual funds between 1990-2009,
180 funds are categorized as closet indexers. Index funds are generally perceived as a low-cost
alternative to active management, Dyck, Lins and Pomorski (2013) report a difference in cost of
0.35% per year between active and passive management. Therefore,before cost, active manage-
ment on average performs approximately the same as passive management. This observation is
consistent with a modified version of the Index Fund Premise in Sharpe (2007), originally used
by Fargo Bank, saying that, “Few of us are as smart as all of us,it is hard to identify them in
advance, and they may charge more than they are worth.”
Empirical evidence suggests that investors spent a significa t amount on the cost of active
investing. According to French (2008), averaging over 1980-20 6, investors in the U.S “spend
0.67% of the value of all NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks each year trying to beat the mar-
ket”. Although, on average, mutual funds in the U.S. tend to underperform the S&P5001, there
is evidence that mutual funds are able to outperform their benchmarks when they are highly ac-
tive2 and when financial markets are less efficient3. More importantly, there are evidences that
sophisticated investors earn positive returns on new cashflows both into and out of the funds
1The early work by Jensen (1968) find that in the 1945-1964 period, mutual funds were on average not able to
outperform the market, even when fund returns are measured before management expenses. Moreover, looking
at unadjusted returns, Gruber (1996) reports, in the 1985-1994 period, that mutual funds underperformed the
market by1.94% per year. More recently, Busse, Goyal and Wahal (2010) examine the performance of 4,617
active domestic equity institutional products between 1991 and 2008. After controlling for the Fama and French
(1993) factors plus momentum, they find that the four-factoralpha is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Furthermore, Dyck et al. (2013) also report an underperformance of0.28% per year by active management after
cost based on the U.S. and Canadian defined benefit pension plans equity holdings over the 1993-2008 period.
2Cremers and Petajisto (2009) find that funds with the highestActive Share, which measures the share of portfolio
holdings that differ from the benchmark, outperform their benchmark by 1.51-2.40% per year. Cremers et al.
(2011) also find that Active Share predicts funds’ future performance when examining the equity mutual funds
world wide.
3Dyck et al. (2013) document that in the EAFE equity markets, net-of-cost active outperformance is 49 bps per
year, while in the less efficient emerging markets the activeoutperformance is a substantial 246 bps per year.
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(Gruber 1996) and they tend to increase allocations to active management in the less efficient
markets, where active strategies work better (Dyck et al. 2013). Therefore, the general per-
ception is that, although active investing is a negative sumga e (French 2008), the group of
sophisticated investors can benefit from it at the expense ofunsophisticated investors or clien-
teles. Hence, the sophisticated investors should keep pursuing active management in trying to
beat the market and the unsophisticated investors should switch to indexing.
This paper considers active investors who are subjective utility maximizers and an index
investor who buys and holds the market portfolio of all riskytocks. In contrary to the conven-
tional view, we show that, when active investors do not know the true probabilities either due
to biases or incomplete information, even for the investor with the most accurate belief, active
investing can be harmful with large welfare costs. Therefore the potential welfare improvement
by switching to an index portfolio can be quite substantial.
In this paper, we adopt the differences-of-opinion (DO) general equilibrium framework that
has been widely used in the literature4. In DO models, agents have symmetric information and
agree to disagree about the underlying model of economic fundamentals. Each agent believes in
his interpretation of the observed information and ignoresth interpretations of others. Essen-
tially, the DO models “highlight aspects of the world that investors still disagree about after they
have learned all they can from each other” (Banerjee and Kreme 2010) and therefore should
be distinguished from rational expectation (RE) models of asymmetric information5. Banerjee
(2011) develops an empirical method to distinguish betweenth RE and DO models.
More specifically, we build a general equilibrium model of a financial market in continuous-
time with active investors who disagree about the drift terms of the dividend processes, either
due to biases or incomplete information. The disagreement motivates the investors to engage
in speculation with each other. The outcome of their speculation depends on whose belief
is more accurate, i.e. closer to the truth. The investors maxi ize their life-time utility of
the consumption under their subjective probability measure . This means that the expected
4See, for example, Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998), Basak (2000, 2005), Anderson, Ghysels and
Juergens (2005), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006), Jouini and Napp (2006, 2007, 2011), Li (2007), David (2008), Berra-
day (2009), Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009), Xiong and Yan (2010), Yan (2010), Cvitanić, Jouini., Malamud.
and Napp (2012), Fedyk, Heyerdahl-Larsen and Walden (2013), Bhamra and Uppal (2014), Hansen (2015) and
Atmaz and Basak (2015).
5In this class of models, uninformed agents try to extract information from currently observable price; see, for
example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Admati (1985), Wang(1993), Watanabe (2008) and Biais, Bossaerts and
Spatt (2010).
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utilities of the investors generally do not coincide with the expected utilities under the objective
probability measure. Following Fedyk et al. (2013), we use the objective expected utilities as a
measure for the expected ex-post welfare.
Apart from the active investors, there is also an index investor who holds the market portfolio
and consumes a fraction of the aggregate dividend. The DO models typically do not consider
index investors for two reasons. Firstly, index investing is in general not an optimal strategy
for investors under their subjective beliefs. Secondly, when index investors consume a constant
fraction of the aggregate dividend, they do not affect the equilibrium prices. One exception is
Chabakauri and Rytchkov (2014) who constrain one group of agents to invest only in an index
and a risk-free asset. When agents have a homogeneous belief, they show that the indexing
actually leads to a welfare reduction instead of improvement. Moreover, the welfare reduction
of the index investing is minimal in Chabakauri and Rytchkov(2014), “in our calibration of
the model the investor would not give up more than 0.15% of hiswealth for the possibility to
trade all assets individually. Thus, indexing does not makeinv stors notably worse off and in
the absence of other market frictions it can be a viable trading strategy.” In contrast, we show
that when the active investing can have large welfare costs tinvestors, an indexing portfolio
can significantly improve the expected ex-post welfare.
Following Fedyk et al. (2013), we consider two active investor ,A andB, A has more accu-
rate belief thanB, in addition to an index investorI. The expected ex-post welfare achieved by
the active and index investors is denoted byUi for i ∈ {A,B, I}. From the extensive literature
on themarket selection hypothesis, eventually investorA with a more accurate belief will drive
investorB to extinction and thus will have a higher consumption growththan the index portfo-
lio in the long run6. Therefore, conventional wisdom would suggest that the expected ex-post
welfare should be ranked asUB < UI < UA, which means investorA is better off than the index
investor who is better off than investorB. This is obviously true whenA’s belief coincides
with the truth. However, when the objective and subjective beliefs differ, we show under certain
conditions, quite remarkably, that the welfare ranking becomesUB < UA < UI , indicating that
the index portfolio dominates the active investing.
6See, for example, Sandroni (2000), Blume and Easley (2006, 209a, 2009b), Kogan, Ross, Wang, Westerfield
(2006, 2012), Yan (2008), Muraviev (2013), Cvitanić and Malamud (2011), Branger, Schlag and Wu (2015).
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In Section 2, we present our baseline model with logarithmicutility and constant hetero-
geneous beliefs. Here, both active investors have incorrect b liefs. In this case, the welfare
ranking depends on two quantities: theabsolute bias ratio0 < ϑ ≤ 1 and thebias correlation
−1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. The former measures the relative accuracy of investors’ beliefs and the latter mea-
sures whether investors make similar or opposite mistakes about the expected dividend returns.
We find that a largerϑ close to1 and a more negativeρ close to−1 favor the index investor and
the welfare rankingUB < UA < UI is more likely to prevail. This implies that, although the
active investor with a more accurate belief almost surely achieve a higher consumption growth
in the long run, he may be worse off than the index investor in terms of the objective expected
utilities. This happens when the belief of investorA is not much more accurate and opposite
to the investor with a less accurate belief. Intuitively, the active investors trade for both spec-
ulative and risk-sharing purposes, the former is caused by disagreement and the latter is for
consumption-smoothing. However, their erroneous beliefsdistort the optimal balance between
speculation and risk-sharing, which hurts their welfare. Moreover, the opposite beliefs lead
to larger disagreement, which makes their consumption paths more volatile and amplifies the
detrimental effect of the erroneous beliefs on the welfare.H nce, in this case, even the investor
with a more accurate belief achieves a lower welfare than theindex investor. In a simple calibra-
tion with plausible parameter values, even when the absolute belief biases are relatively small,
we find that the index portfolio can improve the welfare by 20%for ϑ = 1, that is, when the
active investors are equally biased.
In Section 3, we extend our analysis to CRRA utility with relative risk aversionγ > 0. Apart
from obtaining the same results and intuition to the baseline model, we find that an increase in
the risk aversion has two offsetting effects on investors’ welfare. On the one hand, it increases
the concavity of the utility function, which magnifies the negative impact caused by incorrect
beliefs. On the other hand, it reduces speculation and makesinv tors’ consumption shares less
volatile, which mitigates the aforementioned negative impact. We find that the first effect tends
to dominate the second effect when the risk aversion is belowa threshold, above which the two
effects offset each other. Therefore, in general a higher risk aversion works in the favor of the
index investor. With the same parameter values as in the baseline case, we show that, when
γ = 2, the index portfolio can improve the welfare by more than 50%compared to the active
investing, which is more than double the amount in the logarithmic case withγ = 1.
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We consider the impact of learning in Section 4. Due to the loss of tractability, we use Monte
Carlo simulations to evaluate the objective expected utilities of the active and index investors.
Within this setting, even a perfectly rational investor’s belief can deviate from the truth due
to incomplete information. We find that in the case of constant drifts, the welfare ranking
depends critically on the prior variance of the investor wholearns about the drifts. We find that
a larger prior variance tends to favor the index investor in terms of the welfare. In a complex
learning environment where the drift rates follow mean-reve ting processes and the investors
receive a public signal but disagree about its informativeness, the index portfolio dominates the
active investing when the active investors have the opposite interpretation of the signal (i.e. one
interprets the signal as good news and other interprets it asbad news). In Section 5, we consider
a more realistic scenario where the consumption growth of the index portfolio is more volatile
than the aggregate consumption growth. We conclude the paper in S ction 6 and Appendix A
contains all the proofs.
2. THE MODEL AND WELFARE ANALYSIS
Following Jouini and Napp (2007), Yan (2008), Dumas et al. (2009), and Fedyk et al. (2013),
we consider a dynamic equilibrium model with twoactive investors who trade speculatively
with each other due to heterogeneity in beliefs, and anindex investor who holds the market
portfolio of risky securities and consumes a constant fraction of the aggregate dividend7. Under
the assumptions of logarithmic utility and constant beliefs8, this section provides sufficient con-
ditions under which the index investor achieves a better welfare under the objective probability
measure than the active investors.
2.1. Information Structure and the Securities Market. Consider a continuous-time pure-
exchange economy with a single consumption good. The uncertainty is represented by a fil-
tered probability space (Ω,F , {F(t)},P) on which aK-dimensional Wiener processZ(t) =
7In Section 5, we consider the case in which the index portfolio differs from the market portfolio, and it has a more
volatile consumption growth than that of aggregate endowment.
8In the baseline model, for simplicity we assume beliefs do not update over time. The cost of relaxing this assump-
tion is the loss of tractability. In Section 4, we use Monte Carlo simulations to examine the impact of learning on
welfare.
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(Z1(t), · · · , ZK(t))⊤ is defined. Let{F(t)} be the augmented filtration generated byZ(t). For
simplicity, the Wiener processes are assumed to be uncorrelated9.
There areK risky assets (stocks) and one risk-free bond. The price of the risk-free bondB(t)
follows
dB(t) = r(t)B(t)dt, B(0) = 1, (1)
wherer(t) is the risk-free interest rate. The dividendDk(t) of stockk follows
dDk(t) = Dk(t)[µkdt+ σkdZk(t)], k = 1, 2, · · · , K (2)
with constantµk andσk. LetSk(t) be the ex-dividend price of stockk. Denote the instantaneous
return of stockk asdRk(t) ≡ dSk(t)+Dk(t)dtSk(t) . The vector of instantaneous stock returns is given
by
dR(t) ≡ (dR1(t), · · · , dRK(t)) = µS(t)dt+ σS(t)dZ(t), (3)
whereµS(t) is the vector of expected returns underP andVS(t) ≡ σS(t)σS(t)⊤ is the covari-
ance matrix at timet. By assuming a complete market, there exists a unique state price density
ξ(t) with initial valueξ(0) = 1 and
dξ(t) = −ξ(t)[r(t)dt+ κ(t)⊤dZ(t)], (4)
whereκ(t) = σ(t)−1(µS(t)−r(t)1) denotes the vector of the market prices of risk. We assume
that the riskless bondB is in zero net supply and each risky assetSk hasNk shares available.






2.2. Investors. There are twoactiveinvestorsA andB who are subjective utility maximizers
with probability measuresPA andPB, respectively10. InvestorsA andB have constant beliefs
about the mean dividend growth rates, denoted byµik for i ∈ {A,B} andk = 1, · · · , K. From
9As in Yan (2008) and Fedyk et al. (2013), we can consider correlated Wiener processes with a constant correlation
matrix; however this does not affect our results.
10When investors have homogeneous preference and heterogeneous b liefs, following the market selection liter-
ature (Yan (2008) and Fedyk et al. (2013)), only the investorwith the most accurate belief can survive in the
long-run. Therefore, to conduct a welfare analysis, we consider a parsimonious model of two investors with ho-
mogeneous preference and compare their relative performance to an index portfolio.
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Therefore, both the active investors haveincorrectbeliefs. Parameterθik measures investori’s
optimism/pessimism about stockk’s dividend growth, which is persistent as they do not update
their beliefs over time11. Therefore, to be consistent, under investori’s belief, the stock returns
evolve according to
dR(t) = µiS(t)dt+ σS(t)dZi(t), (8)
whereµiS(t) = µS(t) + σS(t)θi is the vector of expected returns perceived by investori. By











, i ∈ {A,B}, (9)
whereθi = (θi1, θ
i
2, · · · , θiK)⊤. The length of the vectorθi,
‖θi‖ ≡
√
θ⊤i θi, i ∈ {A,B}, (10)
measures investori’s absolute belief bias, which is the total distance betweenPi andP12.
There are two important quantities for deriving our resultsnder the constant beliefs. One is
theabsolute bias ratiobetween the investors and the other is theirbias correlation. We define
these two quantities in the following.
Assumption 2.1. InvestorsA andB have different subjective beliefs, i.e.,θA 6= θB, and the
absolute belief biases are strictly positive and satisfyϑ ≤ 1, where
ϑ ≡ ‖θA‖‖θB‖
is the absolute bias ratio between investorsA andB.
11We examine the impact of learning in Section 4.
12Note that the absolute belief bias defined here is equivalentto the survival index in Yan (2008) and the transfer
index in Fedyk et al. (2013) when investors have homogeneouspreference.
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Under assumption 2.1, both the investors have biased beliefs and investorA is either equally
biased as or less biased thanB. Next, we define thebias correlationbetween the investors as
follows.





, where − 1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. (11)
According to Definition 2.2, the bias correlation measures the linear dependence between
the beliefs of the investors. Whenρ = 1, investorsA andB either both underestimate or
overestimate the drifts of the dividend processes, i.e.θAk θ
B
k > 0, for k = 1, · · · , K. In contrast,
ρ = −1 indicates thatθAk θBk < 0 for all stocks. In this case, one of the investors underestimates
while the other overestimates the drifts. Moreover,ρ = 0 implies that investors’ belief biases
are linearly independent. Furthermore, the bias correlation can be expressed asρ = cos(̟),
where̟ is the angle between vectorsθA andθB. For example,̟ = 0, π2 , π correspond to
ρ = 1, 0,−1 respectively13.
In our baseline model, we assume logarithmic utility. An extension to CRRA utility is given















, i ∈ {A,B}, (12)
















whereβ is the discount rate,ci(t) is the consumption rate,Wi(t) is investori’s wealth and
πi(t) ≡ (πi1(t), · · · , πiK(t))⊤ is the vector of the wealth proportions invested in the stocks. Due








13 Note that when the bias correlationρ = 1 and the absolute bias ratioϑ = 1, the beliefs become homogenous,
i.e. θA = θB.
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whereWi(0) is investori’s intial wealth. By the first order condition, theoptimal consumption
of investori is given by
c∗i (t) = βWi(0)e
−βtMi(t)
ξ(t)
, i = A,B. (15)







(‖θA‖2 − ‖θB‖2)t+ (θA − θB)⊤Z(t)
}
. (16)


















, and xB = 1− xA.
Now we introduce theindexinvestorI who simply holds the market portfolio and consumes
a fixed proportion of the aggregate dividend. The index investor does not affect the equilibrium





whereWI(0) is his initial wealth andWM(0) = WA(0) + WB(0) + WI(0) is the total initial
market wealth. Note that under logarithmic utility, the index portfolio is optimal under the
consensus probability belief(see, for example, Jouini and Napp (2007)),







However, as shown in Jouini and Napp (2007), the index portfolio is no longer optimal when
investors have CRRA utility with relative risk aversion coefficient different from one. Lastly,
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Therefore, the security prices are completely determined by investorsA andB and the index
investor does not play a role.
2.3. Measuring Welfare. Following Fedyk et al. (2013), we measure welfare using theobj c-
tive expected utilities, i.e. the welfare is measured based on the average realized utilities rather
than those under investors’ subjective (biased) beliefs.















We acknowledge that defining a welfare criterion in an economy with heterogeneous beliefs is
not a trivial task. The first problem is whether one should useex-anteor ex-postmeasure of the
welfare. “People’sex antewelfare is their expected welfare, given their probabilityjudgements,
beforetheir expectations are realized. People’sex postwelfare is their welfare as things in fact
turn out” (Hausman and McPherson 1994, p.396). Starr (1973)argues that we should really
care about whether an allocation is ex-post Pareto optimal “th t there be redistribution that will
increase some trader’s realized utility while decreasing no trader’s realized utility” (p.82). This
is a very strong notion of ex-post optimum; “even if the stateof the world were known in the first
period, it would be impossible to find a Pareto-superior alloc tion” (Hammond 1981, p.236).
Moreover, the ex-ante and ex-post optima need not be consiste t when the subjective beliefs
are heterogeneous, marginal rates of substitution that arethe same ex-ante may be different
ex-post. Harris (1978) proposes to correct for the divergence among the ex-post marginal rates
of substitution by quoting ex-ante different set of prices to each individual. One critique of the
ex-post approach is that an ex-post optimal allocation can mke individuals feel worse off ex-
ante. In reality, individuals most likely care about both exp cted and realized utilities (Barberis
and Xiong 2012), they may also deviate from the objectively optimal strategy if they can derive
more satisfaction by having an over-optimistic belief ex-ante (Brunnermeier and Parker 2005).
The second problem, as Brunnermeier, Simsek and Xiong (2014) correctly point out, “In
many realistic situations, the planner does not observe theobjective belief and faces the same
difficulty as individuals do in discriminating different beli fs based on available data.” To tackle
this issue, they introduce a belief neutral welfare criterion, which does not require the planner
to fixate on one particular belief as the correct one. According to their welfare criterion, one
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allocation is Pareto inefficient (efficient) if for every reasonable probability measure it is (not)
dominated by another allocation. Of course, there will be many scenarios where an allocation
is neither Pareto efficient nor inefficient according to the belief-neutral criterion, which makes
it difficult for a social planner to determine an optimal allocation.
In this paper we follow Fedyk et al. (2013) to measure the welfar using the expected ex-post
utility under the objective probabilities, which in practice can be very difficult to estimate. The
social planner, who is concerned about the ex-post welfare of the investors, can either take a
stand on what exactly is the objective probability or entertain all combinations of investors’
subjective beliefs as reasonable candidates (as in Brunnermei r et al. (2014)). We adopt the
former approach, which helps us to clearly identify situations in which the active investing
becomes harmful to the investors and switching to the index portfolio can significantly improve
their expected ex-post welfare. As our welfare analysis will show, there are cases where the
welfare cost of the active investing is almost comparable to“drinking a fatal poison in the
mistaken belief that it was water” (Hausman and McPherson 1994, p.396). The drawback of
our approach is that it forces the planner to fixate on one probability belief as the truth, also any
policies that the planner makes will inevitably make the investors feel worse off ex-ante though
they are expected to be better off ex-post.
2.4. Welfare Analysis. According to Definition 2.3, the difference in the expected ex-post
welfare between investorsA andB is given by



























(‖θB‖2 − ‖θA‖2) > 0,
which is not surprising since investorA has a more accurate belief than investorB. However,
the comparison between investorA and the index investorI is more complex. We show that,
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this does not guarantee thatUI < UA. The difference in the welfare betweenA andI is charac-
terized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. The welfare of the index investor relative to that of investor A is given by












whereη(t) is given by Equation(16).
Based on Lemma 2.4, we now present the main result for the baseline model under logarith-
mic preference.
Proposition 2.5. Assume the investors have logarithmic utility,
• if ρ > 0 and
(S1) : ϑ ≤ ρ,
thenUI < UA. Conversely, ifUA < UI , thenρ < ϑ ≤ 1.
• if ρ < 1, xA = xB and
(S2) : ϑ = 1,
thenUA < UI .
Proposition 2.5 shows that, (i) when the bias correlation issufficiently high, the relatively
accurate investor (A) achieves a better welfare than the index investor; (ii) when both investors
are equally biased, the index investor always achieves a better welfare. The intuition is the
following. When the bias correlationρ = 1, the investors make the same mistakes about the
drifts, that is, they are either both optimistic or both pessimi tic. In this case, the consensus
belief is always more (less) accurate than investorB (A)’s belief. Since the index portfolio
is optimal for a log utility maximizer endowed with the conseus belief, it achieves a better
(worse) welfare than investorB (A). In contrast, whenρ < 1, the consensus belief is able to
diversify away some of the biases of the investor. Thereforeit b comes possible for the index
investor to achieve a better welfare than both the active invstors depending on the absolute bias
ratioϑ. In the case whereϑ = 1, the index investoralwaysachieves a better welfare.
One may find it counter-intuitive that although investorA has the highest consumption growth
in the long-run, he does not necessarily achieve a better welfare than the index portfolio. The ex-
planation is the following. InvestorA trades speculatively due to his disagreement with investor
14 INDEX PORTFOLIO AND WELFARE ANALYSIS








FIGURE 1. InvestorA’s outperforming regionΩA (marked by45o lines with a
solid boundary) and sufficient regionΩSA (marked by vertical lines with a dashed
boundary).
B, but also trades for risk-sharing. When investorA has the correct belief, his consumption
plan finds the optimal balance between speculation and risk-sharing, which maximizes his wel-
fare under the objective probabilities. However, when his belief is incorrect, such balance is
distorted and he may over-speculate, which makes his consumption path too volatile.
2.5. Numerical Analysis. Proposition 2.5 only provides sufficient conditions forUI < UA and
UA < UI . To have a better understanding about the relationship between the absolute bias ratio,
the bias correlation and the welfare of the active and index investors, we conduct a numerical
analysis to examine theoutperforming regionΩA, where investorA achieves a better welfare
than the index investorI, that is,UI < UA. Therefore, outside the regionΩA, the index investor
outperforms investorA, i.e.,UA < UI . We compareΩA to the sufficient regionΩSA defined by
condition (S1) in Proposition 2.5, obviouslyΩSA ⊂ ΩA.
In Figure 1 we set investorB’s absolute bias‖θB‖ = 0.25 and consider the absolute bias ratio
0 < ϑ ≤ 1. Figure 1 leads to three observations. (i) We observe that both the outperforming
and sufficient regionsΩA andΩSA are increasing with the bias correlationρ. Therefore,A is
more likely to outperformI whenρ → 1. On the other hand, whenρ → −1, I is more likely
to outperformA. (ii) Whenρ < 0, the sufficient regionΩSA is empty, but not the outperforming
regionΩA. Therefore, when the belief biases are negatively correlated, the index investor does
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not always outperform investorA, depending on the absolute bias ratioϑ. (iii) Whenϑ = 1 and
ρ < 1, the index investor always outperforms investorA, which is consistent with (S2).
The above analysis shows that an indexing portfolio can potentially provide better expected
ex-post welfare than all active portfolios. We now conduct awelfare analysis to quantitatively
measure the potential improvement in the welfare when investorA switches to the index portfo-
lio, especially when the biases are of similar magnitude andare negatively correlated among the
investors. More specifically, we use numerical integrationo compute the difference in welfare
betweenA andI.
From Definition 2.3, the expected ex-post welfare of one unitof wealth invested in the index














In order to evaluate (23) in closed form, we assume only the first stock is in a positive supply,
that isN1 = 1 andNk = 0, k = 2, · · · , K. The mean growth rate and volatility of the aggregate













Table 1 reports14 (UI −UA)/|UA| for different levels of the bias correlationρ and the absolute
bias ratioϑ when investorB’s absolute bias is relatively small in panel A and large in pael
B. The results show that switching to an index portfolio can improve the expected the ex-post
welfare of investorA significantly, especially whenρ < 0 andϑ → 1. For example, in the
case whereρ = −0.8 andϑ = 1, the welfare improvement for investorA is 69.8% when
‖θB‖ = 1 and 20% when‖θB‖ = 0.25. However, the amount of improvement decreases with
the bias correlation. For example, whenρ = 0.8 andϑ = 1, the improvement reduces to 39.2%
when‖θB‖ = 1 and 4.2% when‖θB‖ = 0.25. Moreover, the results show that it is relatively
more difficult for the index portfolio to provide welfare improvement when the biases are more
positively correlated and the investor with the relativelyl ss accurate belief has a larger absolute
bias. Overall, under logarithmic utility, we needϑ ≥ 0.6 in order for(UI −UA)/|UA| > 0 when
14Note that for the given parameter values, bothUI andUA are negative.
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Panel A:‖θB‖ = 0.25
ϑ 0.01 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
ρ = 0.8 -0.090 -0.102 -0.101 -0.083 -0.040 0.042
ρ = 0.5 -0.089 -0.094 -0.084 -0.055 0.000 0.087
ρ = 0.0 -0.089 -0.081 -0.057 -0.014 0.052 0.140
ρ = −0.5 -0.088 -0.069 -0.033 0.020 0.092 0.180
ρ = −0.8 -0.088 -0.062 -0.020 0.039 0.113 0.200
Panel B:‖θB‖ = 1.0
ϑ 0.01 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
ρ = 0.8 -0.331 -0.335 -0.335 -0.329 -0.290 0.392
ρ = 0.5 -0.331 -0.332 -0.328 -0.309 -0.200 0.529
ρ = 0.0 -0.330 -0.327 -0.313 -0.262 -0.032 0.625
ρ = −0.5 -0.330 -0.321 -0.293 -0.205 0.110 0.677
ρ = −0.8 -0.330 -0.316 -0.280 -0.167 0.180 0.698
TABLE 1. The improvement in the welfare(UI − UA)/|UA| by switching to
an index portfolio, for absolute bias ratioϑ ∈ [0.01, 1.0], bias correlationρ ∈
[−0.8, 0.8], subjective discount rateβ = 0.02, and the mean growth rate and
volatility of the aggregate dividend process are given byµ = 0.02 andσ = 0.02
respectively.
‖θB‖ = 0.25 (panel A), andϑ ≥ 0.8 when‖θB‖ = 1 (panel B). Therefore, the absolute bias
ratio plays a more important role than the bias correlation.
In summary, we have shown that, under logarithmic utility and constant beliefs, the index
investor is more likely to achieve a better welfare than the active investors when (i) the active
investors’ are close to being equally biased and (ii) their biases are more negatively correlated,
leading to a diversification effect on the consensus belief.Intuitively, a negative (positive) bias
correlation amplifies (mitigates) the negative effect of the belief bias of the active investors on
their welfare.
2.6. Performance Analysis. As we claimed earlier, the relatively more accurate investor (A)
will drive the less accurate investor (B) out of the market in the long run. In the case of constant
beliefs, we can compute thismarket-selectiontime explicitly as follows.
Lemma 2.6. Define a market-selection timeτ > 0 as the expected first time the consumption
ratio betweenA andB reachesl ≤ xA/xB, i.e.
τ ≡ E0[inf{t : c∗A(t)/c∗B(t) = l}]. (25)
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Lemma 2.6 shows that the market selection time depends only on the absolute belief biases
and not on the bias correlation. Therefore, a fast market selction does not necessarily imply
that the active investing is better off than the index investing or vice versa. To illustrate, we
set the absolute bias to be relative large for agentB (‖θB‖ = 1) in Figure 2 and compute the
market-selection time for different absolute bias ratios.It can be seen that even forϑ = 0.8, it
takes less than 10 years on average for the consumption ratioto reachl = 5. However, as we
have shown in Table 1 panel B, the welfare comparison betweenthe active and index investing
depends crucially on the bias correlation (e.g(UI − UA)/|UA| > (<)0 whenρ = −0.8(0.8)).
Intuitively, a negative bias correlation makes the market selection process more volatile, which




























































































FIGURE 2. Market selection timeτ = E[inf{t : c∗A(t)/c∗B(t) = l}] under con-
stant beliefs. InvestorB’s absolute belief bias‖θB‖ = 1, initial consumption
ratioxA/xB = 1.
We can also compute theSharpe ratiosfor the active and index portfolios, which are defined








for i ∈ {A,B, I}, where
dRip(t) = r(t)dt+ π
∗
i (t)
⊤(µS(t)− r(t)1)dt+ π∗i (t)⊤σS(t)dZ(t) (28)
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is portfolio i’s instantaneous return. In the case of logarithmic utility, we can express the port-











For simplicity, we assume only the first risky asset is in a positive supply and agents agree on the
drift of the aggregate dividend process, that isµi1 = µ for i = A,B. In this case, the risk-free
rate is given byr = β + µ− σ2 and the Sharpe ratio of the index portfolio is constant,
SI(t) =
µ+ β − r
σ
= σ. (30)
In comparison, the Sharpe ratios of the active portfolios depends on the distribution of the




λB(t)(‖θB‖2 − ‖θA‖2) + λB(t)2‖θA − θB‖2
√





λA(t)(‖θB‖2 − ‖θA‖2) + λA(t)2‖θA − θB‖2
√
σ2 + λA(t)2‖θA − θB‖2
. (32)
Equations (30), (31) and (32) lead to the following observations. First, since‖θA‖ ≤ ‖θB‖
investorA alwayshas the highest Sharpe ratio regardless of the distributionof the consump-
tion shares. Second, when investorsA andB have the same absolute belief bias, they both
outperformthe index portfolio, that isSA = SB ≥ SI . These results are in sharp contrast to
the welfare analysis. This illustrates that the Sharpe ratio can be misleading in favoring ac-
tive investing over the index portfolio even when active investing has a significant welfare cost.
Furthermore, Figure 3 (a) and (b) show thatSA ↓ andSB ↑ whenϑ → 1. Whenϑ = 1 both the
active portfolios outperform the index portfolio. More interestingly, Figure 3 (c) and (d) show
thatSA ↑ andSB ↑ whenρ → −1, which is again the opposite to what we found from the
welfare results in Table 1.
Our intuition for the above results is as follows. The Sharperatio only considers the trade-off
between standard deviation and expected excess return. In this scenario the active portfolios
actually improve the trade-off by taking on more risk. In comparison, the welfare analysis cares
about whether any increase in the volatility of the consumption growth results positive growth in
the consumption share. Therefore, the two performance measures are not consistent in general.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(c) SA − SI ; ϑ = 0.8 (d) SB − SI ; ϑ = 0.8
FIGURE 3. Excess Sharpe ratio for active portfolios of investorsA andB for
bias correlationρ = 0 and absolute bias ratioϑ ∈ [0, 1] in plots (a) and (b),
ϑ = 0.8 andρ ∈ [−0.8, 0.8] in plots (c) and (d). InvestorB’s absolute bias is set
to ‖θB‖ = 0.25 and volatility of aggregate consumption growthσ = 0.02.
3. CRRA UTILITY











, i ∈ {A,B},
subject to the budget constraint (14). Following Jouini andNapp (2007), the optimal consump-









whereyi is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the budget constraint. The initial wealth
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Furthermore, the optimal consumption of the index portfolio remains the same as that in (18).
























, i = A,B. (37)
Therefore, given (18), (33) and (35), the expected ex-post instantaneous utility of investorA


























Equation (38) shows that, unlike the case of logarithmic utility, the comparison between investor
A and the index portfolioI depends on the distributions of the initial wealth and consumption















in a closed form that is independent of
the initial wealth and consumption distributions. This helps analytical tractability for the welfare
analysis.
Lemma 3.1. Assume (i) asset1 is in a positive supply of one share (N1 = 1) and all other
assets are in zero net supply (Nk = 0, k = 2, · · · , K), (ii) investorsA andB have the same
initial wealth, that isWA(0) = WB(0), and (iii) investorsA andB agree on the drift of the
aggregate dividend process, that is,θA1 = θ
B
1 = θ1. Then, investorsA andB have the same
initial consumption, that isλA(0) = λB(0), and the expected ex-post instantaneous utility of
15Unlike the case of logarithmic utility, the state price density and the optimal consumptions of the active and index
portfolios depend on the distributions of the initial wealth and consumption, though the equilibrium price is only
determined by the beliefs of investorsA andB. Note thatxA + xB =
(cA(0)+cB(0))/D(0)
(WA(0)+WB(0))/WM (0)
= 1−cI(0)/D(0)1−WI (0)/WM (0)
andcI(0)/D(0) = WI(0)/WM (0). HencexA + xB = 1.
16The expected ex-post instantaneous utility of investorB can be written in a similar way.
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3.1. Effect of Risk Aversion. Note that from Lemma 3.1, investorA has a higher expected



























> 1, γ < 1.
(40)
Next we present the main result for the case of CRRA utility.









γ2 + ρ2 − 1), (41)
• For
√
1− ρ2 ≤ γ < 2, if
(S3) : L ≤ ϑ ≤ R,
thenUI < UA.
• For γ = 2, UI < UA if and only if
(NS) : ϑ < R.
• For γ > 2, if UI < UA, then
(N) : ϑ < R.
Proposition 3.2 provides a sufficient condition (S3) (forγ < 2), a necessary and sufficient
condition (NS) (forγ = 2), and a necessary condition (N) (forγ > 2) for investorA to achieve
a better welfare than the index investorI. It leads to the following four observations. (i) For
γ = 1, condition (S3) becomes0 ≤ ϑ ≤ ρ, which reduces to the sufficient condition (S1) in
Proposition 2.5. (ii) When the bias correlationρ = 1 and the relative risk aversion coefficient
satisfies1 ≤ γ < 2, we always haveUI < UA (sinceL ≤ 0 andR = 1). Hence the sufficient
condition (S3) is always satisfied. This is consistent with our result in the baseline model. (iii)
For γ = 2, the sufficient condition (S3) becomes a necessary and sufficient ondition (NS).
The lower bound is no longer relevant becauseL < 0. Condition (NS) confirms that a more
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negative bias correlation favors the index portfolio. To illustrate, whenρ = 1, (NS) becomes
ϑ < 1, which is always true, thereforeUI < UA. However, whenρ = −1, (NS) becomes
ϑ < 1/3, hence we haveUI < UA for 0 < ϑ < 1/3 andUA ≤ UI for 1/3 ≤ ϑ ≤ 1. Therefore,
the bias correlation makes a significant difference. (iv) For γ > 2, condition (S3) becomes only
a necessary condition (N). Note thatR ≤ 1 andR = 1 if and only ifρ = 1. When both investors
have the absolute bias (ϑ = 1), condition (N) is never satisfied forρ < 1. In this case, we have
UA < UI , which is consistent with condition (S2) derived under logarithmic utility.
3.2. Numerical Analysis. To better understand the impact of the risk aversion on the welfare,
we conduct a numerical analysis to examine theoutperforming regionof investorA (in which
UI < UA) for risk aversion coefficient0 < γ ≤ 5.

















(a)0 < γ < 1 (b) 1 < γ ≤ 5
FIGURE 4. The outperforming regionΩA (marked by45o lines with a solid
boundary), sufficient regionΩSA (marked by vertical lines with a dashed bound-
ary) and necessary regionΩNA (marked by horizontal lines with a dot-dashed
boundary) for risk aversion0 < γ < 1 in plot (a) and0 < γ ≤ 5 in plot (b),
absolute bias ratio0 ≤ ϑ ≤ 1, investorB’s absolute bias‖θB‖ = 0.25 and bias
correlationρ = 0.
In Figure 4, we compare the outperforming regionΩA with the sufficient regionΩSA defined
by the sufficient condition (S3), and the necessary regionΩNA defined by the necessary condition
(N) in Proposition 3.2. We plot three regionsΩSA,ΩA andΩ
N
A for the bias correlationρ = 0 and
the relative risk aversion0 < γ < 1 in plot (a) and1 < γ ≤ 5 in plot (b). Forγ < 1,
the sufficient region indicated by condition (S3) is empty (ΩSA = ∅). In comparison, panel
(a) shows that the outperforming regionΩA covers more than half of the entire space and the
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region is shrinking inγ. This suggests that, for a given absolute bias ratio, when thbiases
are uncorrelated, an increase in the risk aversion (up to 1) actually favors the index portfolio.
Plot (b) shows that whenγ > 1, we haveΩSA ⊆ ΩA for 1 < γ < 2, ΩSA = ΩA = ΩNA for
γ = 2 andΩA ⊆ ΩNA for 2 < γ < 5. Moreover, asγ increases, the outperforming regionΩA
is monotonically decreasing up to approximatelyγ = 2 and then remains constant, whereas the
sufficient/necessary regionsΩSA andΩ
N
A are monotonically increasing.
The above numerical analysis indicates that a higher risk aversion favors the index investor,
however the marginal effect is diminishing and disappears after the risk aversion reaches a
certain threshold. The intuition is the following. A higherrisk aversion leads to increasing con-
cavity in the utility function, which magnifies the negativeeffect of low consumption shares.
However, it also reduces the speculation between the investors, which makes their relative con-
sumption shares less volatile. When the risk aversion is below the threshold, the first effect
dominates the second, which makes the active portfolios wore ff and favors the index portfo-
lio. On the other hand, when the risk aversion is above the threshold, the two effects offset each
other.
To better understand the impact of the bias correlation, we conduct a numerical analysis for
ρ = −1 andρ = 1 respectively. Figure 5 shows the outperforming, sufficientand necessary
regions forρ = 1 and0 < γ < 1 in plot (a),ρ = 1 and1 < γ ≤ 5 in plot (b), ρ = −1 and
0 < γ < 1 in plot (c), andρ = −1 and1 < γ ≤ 5 in plot (d). Plots (a) and (b) show that, when
the bias correlationρ = 1, the outperforming regionΩA covers the entire space, suggesting
thatUI < UA for all risk aversionγ ∈ (0, 5]. In contrast, plots (c) and (d) show that when
ρ = −1, the outperforming regionΩA becomes significantly smaller compared to the case of
ρ = 1. Therefore, a more negative bias correlation works in favorof the index investor, which
is consistent with the intuitions in the baseline model.
We now conduct a welfare analysis to examine the amount of thewelfare improvement by
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(a)0 < γ < 1; ρ = 1 (b) 1 < γ ≤ 5; ρ = 1

















(c) 0 < γ < 1; ρ = −1 (d) 1 < γ ≤ 5; ρ = −1
FIGURE 5. The outperforming regionΩA (marked by45o lines with a solid
boundary), sufficient regionΩSA (marked by vertical lines with a dashed bound-
ary) and necessary regionΩNA (marked by horizontal lines with a dot-dashed
boundary) for risk aversion0 < γ ≤ 5, absolute bias ratio0 ≤ ϑ ≤ 1, investor
B’s absolute belief bias‖θB‖ = 0.25 and bias correlationρ = 1 in panels (a)
and (b),ρ = −1 in panels (c) and (d).

















































dt = β − (1− γ)(µ− γσ2/2)
assumingβ > (1 − γ)(µ − γσ2/2). We use numerical integration to evaluate the welfare
in equation (43). Note that forγ > 1, sinceUA < 0 the welfare improvement is given by
(UI − UA)/|UA| = 1 − UI/UA. Whenγ < 1, sinceUA > 0 we obtain(UI − UA)/|UA| =
UI/UA − 1.
Panel A:γ = 1/2
ϑ 0.01 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
ρ = 0.8 -0.191 -0.204 -0.205 -0.188 -0.123 0.102
ρ = 0.5 -0.191 -0.195 -0.185 -0.149 -0.057 0.153
ρ = 0.0 -0.190 -0.182 -0.156 -0.100 0.006 0.195
ρ = −0.5 -0.189 -0.170 -0.131 -0.064 0.046 0.219
ρ = −0.8 -0.189 -0.163 -0.118 -0.047 0.064 0.229
Panel B:γ = 2
ϑ 0.01 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
ρ = 0.8 -0.091 -0.106 -0.103 -0.080 -0.034 0.041
ρ = 0.5 -0.091 -0.096 -0.083 -0.049 0.012 0.109
ρ = 0.0 -0.090 -0.080 -0.049 0.008 0.100 0.246
ρ = −0.5 -0.089 -0.063 -0.012 0.072 0.204 0.420
ρ = −0.8 -0.088 -0.052 0.012 0.114 0.277 0.551
TABLE 2. The improvement in the expected ex-post welfare(UI−UA)/|UA| by
switching to an index portfolio under CRRA utility, for absolute bias ratioϑ ∈
[0.01, 1.0], bias correlationρ ∈ [−0.8, 0.8], investorB’s absolute bias‖θB‖ =
0.25, subjective discount rateβ = 0.02, and mean growth rate and volatility of
the aggregate dividend process are given byµ = 0.02 andσ = 0.02 respectively.
Table 2 reports the results for(UI − UA)/|UA| for relative risk aversionγ = 1/2 andγ = 2.
Compared to the results in Table 1 panel A, there are more (less) ca es forUI > UA whenγ >
(<)1, which is consistent with the result that a higher risk aversion favors the index portfolio.
Panel A shows that, forγ = 1/2, welfare improvement does not occur until bias correlation
ρ ≤ 0 and the absolute bias ratioϑ ≥ 0.8. In comparison, panel B shows that, forγ = 2 and
ρ = −0.8, the welfare improvement occurs even whenϑ = 0.4. Again, this is because the effect
from increasing concavity in the utility function dominates the effect from decreasing volatility
in the consumption shares.
Moreover, the magnitude of the change in the welfare is also much larger compared to the
baseline model. For example, whenρ = −0.8 andϑ = 1, the improvement in the welfare
is 55.1% forγ = 2 compared to 20% under logarithmic utility. On the other hand, when
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ρ = 0.8 andϑ = 0.4, reduction in the welfare is -20.5% forγ = 1/2 compared to -10.1% under
logarithmic utility.
4. IMPACT OF LEARNING
In this section we relax the assumption of the constant beliefs and assume the investors learn
about the true drifts of the dividend processes. To examine the effect of learning, we consider
two cases. In the first case, we consider a simple environmentwhere the true drifts are constants
as in equation (2). In the second case, we consider a more complex environment where the
true drifts follow mean-reverting stochastic processes. In the second case, in addition to the
dividend processes, investors continuously observe public signals about the dividends, which
they use to update their beliefs. For each dividend processDk(t), let mik(t) ≡ Eit[µk(t)] and
νik(t) ≡ Eit[(mik(t) − µk(t))2] be investori’s subjective belief of its true drift and posterior
variance at timet respectively.
4.1. Constant Drifts. Assume that the true drifts of the dividend processes are constant,µk(t) =
µk for k = 1, · · · , K in (2). The investors update their beliefs to learn about theru drifts. The









, k = 1, · · · , K, i = A,B, (44)








and the initial condition is characterized by prior distribution µk ∼ N (mik(0), νik(0)). From












, k = 1, · · · , K, i = A,B. (45)
For simplicity, we assume investorB has constant beliefsµBk , which is a special case of (45)
where the initial posterior varianceνBk → 0. Thus investorB’s deviation from the truth is given
by θBk = (µ
B
k − µk)/σk for k = 1, · · · , K, meaning that investorB makes persistent mistakes
about the true drifts whereas investorA gradually learns about the truth.
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We assume investorsA andB have logarithmic utility. The difference in the welfareUI −UA
can then be computed by Monte Carlo simulation using equation (22) with xA = xB = 12 .
Moreover, there are two risky assets, which are claims to thedividend processes, however only
the first risky asset is in a positive supply, that isN1 = 1 andN2 = 0. In this case, the welfare




k (0) = ν
for k = 1, 2, meaning investorsA andB initially have the same beliefs about the drifts. We
simulate10, 000 paths of the processes{ln(Mi(t))}i∈{A,B} under the true probability measure
P using a time increment of∆t = 0.01 for T = 350 years in order to evaluate (22).
ν 0.012 0.022 0.042 0.082 0.12
θBk = −0.25 -0.019 0.127 0.291 0.437 0.480
θBk = −0.5 -0.211 -0.160 -0.062 0.090 0.134
θBk = −1.0 -0.281 -0.279 -0.260 -0.215 -0.192
TABLE 3. Improvement in the welfare(UI−UA)/|UA| by switching to an index
portfolio under Bayesian learning with constant drifts. InvestorA’s initial prior
µk ∼ N (θBk , ν), subjective discount rateβ = 0.02, drift and volatility for the
dividend processes are given byµk = 0.02 andσk = 0.02 respectively.
Table 3 shows that switching to an index portfolio results inignificant welfare improvement
when investorB’s absolute bias|θBk | is small and investorA’s prior varianceν is large. For
example, whenθBk = −0.25 andν = 0.12, the welfare improves by 48%. This result may seem
counter-intuitive at first; how can an index portfolio provide better welfare than an optimal
portfolio based on learning? The reason is two-fold. Firstly, a though investorA is perfectly
rational, he has incomplete information about the true drifts, which means that his subjective
and the objective probabilities do not coincide. Although his belief eventually converges to the
truth, initially there can be large deviations from the truth especially when the prior variance is
large. Secondly, when investorB’s absolute bias is relatively small, it limits the potential g in
from speculation for investorA. Note that in the limit asθBk → 0, investorA underperforms
bothB and the index investor. In summary, the results in Table 3 illustrate that an index portfolio
can potentially outperform an optimal portfolio strategy based on Bayesian learning in a general
equilibrium framework.
We also use Monte-Carlo simulation to estimate the market sel ction time. Figure 6 shows
that in this scenario investorA eventually drive out investorB in the long run and the market
selection time increases withA’s prior varianceν. For example, whenν = 0.012, it takes























































































FIGURE 6. Speed of market selectionτ = E[inf{t : c∗A(t)/c∗B(t) = l}] under
Bayesian learning with constant drifts. InvestorB’s beliefθBk = −0.25, A’s ini-
tial prior µk ∼ N (θBk , ν), subjective discount rateβ = 0.02, drift and volatility
for the dividend processes are given byµk = 0.02 andσk = 0.02 respectively,
k = 1, 2.







of his consumption share to investorA). In comparison, whenν = 0.12, it takes
τ ≈ 117 years. Therefore, when investorA becomes more uncertain about his prior belief, the
market selection can be quite slow.
4.2. Time-varying Drifts. We assume that in addition to the dividend processDk(t), the in-
vestors also observe a signal processsk(t). More specifically, following Dumas et al. (2009),
the dividend processes evolve according to
dDk(t)
Dk(t)
= µk(t)dt + σkdZk(t), (46)
dµk(t) = −ζk(µk(t)− µ̄k)dt+ σ̃kdZ̃k(t) (47)
and the public signal process follows
dsk(t) = σ̂k(φkdZ̃k(t) +
√
1− φ2kdẐk(t)) (48)
for k = 1, · · · , K, whereZk(t), Z̃k(t) andẐk(t) are independent Wiener processes. The in-
vestors update their beliefs based on the filtration generation byFt = {Dk(t), sk(t)}. However,
they disagree about the parameterφk, which measures the informativeness of the public signal.
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We denote their beliefs asφik, i = A,B. Thus, investors’ beliefs evolve according to
























Whenφik = 0, investori pays no attention to the public signal and treats it as a pure noise.
Whenφik = 1 investori behaves as if the underlying drifts are fully revealed by thepublic
signal. We assume that under the objective probability measur P, φk = 0. Therefore, investor



















for k = 1, · · · , K.
As in the case of the constant drifts, we use Monte-Carlo simulations (with the same time
increment and horizon) to evaluate the welfare difference between investorA and the index
investor in (22) and report the results in Table 4. Because ofthe public signals, we need four
risky assets to complete the market. We assume assets 1 and 2 are claims to the dividend
processes withN1 = 1 andN2 = 0 while assets 3 and 4 are tradable, non-dividend paying





S,kdZ(t) for k = 3, 4, (51)
whereZ(t) = (Z1(t), Z2(t), Ẑ1(t), Ẑ2(t))⊤. Furthermore, for simplicity, we assumeφBk = φ
andφAk = αφ with α ∈ [−1, 1), k = 1, 2. Therefore, investorA’s belief about the informative-
ness of the public signal is more accurate than that ofB.
Table 4 leads to the following observations. Firstly, when investorA correctly interprets the
public signal (i.e.α = 0), switching to the index portfolio cannot improve the expected ex-post
welfare for all the values ofφ considered. Secondly, when investorA misinterprets the signal,
switching to the index portfolio can improve welfare whenα → −1. The intuition is that
whenα → −1, not only areA andB’s interpretations equally inaccurate, their beliefs biases
are also less correlated. From (49), they interpret dividend news in a similar way but public
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α -1.0 -0.8 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.8
φ = 0.1 0.114 0.069 0.017 -0.037 -0.048 -0.028
φ = 0.2 0.262 0.162 0.025 -0.117 -0.150 -0.100
φ = 0.5 0.579 0.267 -0.101 -0.321 -0.356 -0.322
φ = 0.8 0.785 0.092 -0.303 -0.405 -0.423 -0.418
TABLE 4. The welfare improvement(UI − UA)/|UA| by switching to an index
portfolio under learning and time-varying drifts. Apart from α and φ, other
parameter values are given byβ = 0.02, σk = 0.02, ζk = 0.2, µ̄k = 0.015 and
σ̃k = 0.03 for k = 1, 2.
signal in the opposite way. In this case, the speculation makes neitherA andB better off since
it only increases their consumption volatility. Secondly,the welfare improvement becomes
increasingly significant whenα → −1 andφ → 1. For example, whenα = −1 andφ = 0.8,
switching to the index portfolio improves the expected ex-post welfare by a massive 78.5%.
However, whenA interprets the signal more accurately, for example whenα = −0.8 and
φ = 0.8, the welfare improvement drops to just 9.2%. In summary, we show that our baseline
results are robust even in a more complex learning environment as we identify scenarios under
which an index portfolio leads to significant welfare improvement over the active investing.
Figure 7 plots the market-selection time for different values ofφ with α = −0.8 in plot
(a) and different values ofα with φ = 0.5 in plot (b). Firstly, plot (a) shows that the market
selection can be very fast whenφ → 1. For example, whenφ = 0.8, it takes onlyτ ≈ 5 years
for investorB to lose1/3 of consumption share toA (i.e. l = 5). In comparison, it takes155
years whenφ = 0.1. Secondly, plot (b) shows that the market selection time is ls sensitive to
α. For example, the market selection time forl = 5 increases slightly from8.6 to 10.3 years
whenα increases from0 to 0.5. Furthermore, plot (b) also shows that only the absolute value
of α matters and not its sign. Intuitively, investorA becomes perfectly rational when|α| → 0
and equally irrational asB when|α| → 1. In contrast, the sign ofα matters significantly for the
expected ex-post welfare as we have shown in Table 4.
5. A MORE VOLATILE INDEX PORTFOLIO
We relax the assumption that the index coincides with the market portfolio whose dividend
process is exactly the aggregate endowment. We assume that the aggregate endowment process
is given by
D(t) = D1(t) +D2(t), (52)
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(a)φ ∈ [0.1, 0.8] (b) α ∈ [−0.8, 0.8]
FIGURE 7. Market-selection timeτ = E[inf{t : c∗A(t)/c∗B(t) = l}] under
sentiment learning with time-varying drifts,α = −0.8 andφ ∈ [0.1, 0.8] in plot
(a),φ = 0.5 andα ∈ [−0.8, 0.8] in plot (b). Other parameter values are given by
β = 0.02, σk = 0.02, ζk = 0.2, µ̄k = 0.015 andσ̃k = 0.03 for k = 1, 2.
whereD1(t) andD2(t) are geometric Brownian motions as described in (6) with drifts µk
and volatilitiesσk with k = 1, 2. Moreover, index investorI holds stock 2 and consumes
its dividend, thuscI(t) = D2(t). Furthermore, we assumeσ1 ≤ σ2, thus index investor’s
consumption growth is more volatile than that of the aggregate endowment.
InvestorsA andB have logarithmic preferences and constant beliefs about the drifts as in our
baseline model. Since the optimal consumptions of the active portfolios are given by (15) and
market clearing condition requires thatc∗A(t)+c
∗
B(t) = D1(t). It is straightforward to show that





whereM(t) characterizes the consensus probability belief as in (19).Using the state price











β + σ21 + (µ
A
2 − µA1 )
+
xB
β + σ21 + (µ
B
2 − µB1 )
. (54)
For simplicity, we assume for each investor,µi1 = µ
i
2 for i = A,B, thusWI(0) no longer
depends on the subjective beliefs. Next, we compute the welfare of the index investor in closed-




ln(β + σ21) +
1
β2
(µ2 − σ22/2), (55)
17We assume that the initial values are given byDk(0) = 1 for k = 1, 2.
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Equations (55) and (56) show that one part of the difference ithe welfare is due to speculation,
another part is due tounder-diversification– the consumption growth of the index portfolio is
more volatile than the aggregation consumption growth. We computeUA in (56) using numer-
ical integration assuming thatxA = xB = 12 . Furthermore, we assumeθ
A
k = −αθBk , k = 1, 2,
such that the bias correlationρ = −1 and the absolute bias ratioϑ = α.
α 0.01 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
σ2 = 0.02 -0.215 -0.195 -0.155 -0.073 0.081 0.305
σ2 = 0.05 -0.237 -0.217 -0.176 -0.093 0.064 0.292
σ2 = 0.10 -0.315 -0.294 -0.251 -0.162 0.005 0.247
σ2 = 0.15 -0.446 -0.423 -0.375 -0.278 -0.094 0.172
TABLE 5. The welfare improvement(UI − UA)/|UA| under logarithmic utility
and a more volatile index portfolio. Investors’ beliefs aregiven byθBk = −0.25
andθAk = −αθBk , k = 1, 2. Other parameter values are given byβ = 0.02,
σ1 = 0.02 andµk = 0.02 for k = 1, 2.
Table 5 shows that a more volatile index portfolio reduces thpotential welfare improvement
by switching to the index portfolio. However, when the investor are equally biased (i.e.α =
1), the welfare improvements(UI − UA)/|UA| = 24.7% whenσ2 = 0.10 and 17.2% when
σ2 = 0.15. Therefore, although the welfare of the index portfolio deteriorates due to under-
diversification, it can still provide a significant welfare improvement when the active investors
have negatively correlated biases with the same magnitude.
Next, instead of constant beliefs, we assume that investorA updates his belief and learns
about the drifts over time (as in Section 4.1) with his priorsgiven byµAk (0) ∼ N (µBk , ν) for
k = 1, 2. Note that, assumeµB1 = µ
B
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As in Section 4.1, we computeUA in (56) andWI(0) using Monte-Carlo simulation with∆t =
0.01, T = 350 and10, 000 simulated paths.
Panel A:(UI − UA)/|UA|
ν 0.012 0.022 0.042 0.082 0.102
σ2 = 0.02 -0.029 0.115 0.277 0.427 0.471
σ2 = 0.05 -0.059 0.005 0.133 0.298 0.348
σ2 = 0.10 -0.048 -0.067 -0.084 0.007 0.014
σ2 = 0.15 -0.107 -0.113 -0.383 -0.793 -1.256
Panel B:ln[WI(0)]
ν 0.012 0.022 0.042 0.082 0.102
σ2 = 0.02 3.944 3.947 3.953 3.954 3.950
σ2 = 0.05 3.855 3.960 4.039 4.068 4.079
σ2 = 0.10 3.660 3.894 4.374 4.775 5.050
σ2 = 0.15 3.545 3.746 4.974 7.368 9.810
TABLE 6. The welfare improvement(UI − UA)/|UA| under logarithmic utility
and a more volatile index portfolio. InvestorB’s belief is given byθBk = −0.25
andθAk = −αθBk . InvestorA learns about the drifts with priorµAk (0) ∼ N (µBk , ν)
for k = 1, 2. Other parameter values are given byβ = 0.02, σ1 = 0.02 and
µk = 0.02.
When compared to Table 3, Table 6 panel A shows that a larger prior varianceν no longer
monotonically increases the welfare improvement by switching to an index portfolio. When
the consumption growth the index portfolio becomes very volatile, for exampleσ2 = 0.15, an
increasing in the prior variance actually further deteriorates its welfare relative to that of investor
A. The reason is as follows. Asν increases, although the speculation makes the consumption
growth of the active investors more volatile, it also makes the index portfolio initially more
expensive (i.e.WI(0) increases). Note that when the index portfolio coincides with the market
portfolio, its value is fixed atWI(0) = 1/β (i.e. unaffected by agents’ subjective beliefs), which
is no longer true here. Table 6 panel B shows thatWI(0) is monotonically increasing in bothν
andσ2. Therefore, in the case of learning there is a trade off betwen the initial cost of the index
portfolio and the welfare improvement it can potentially provide over the active portfolios.
6. CONCLUSION
We show that, in terms of the welfare measured by the expectedrealized (ex-post) utility,
an index portfolio can dominate active investing. Our baseline model has logarithmic pref-
erence and constant beliefs, we also consider extensions toCRRA preference, learning under
incomplete information and an alternative specification ofthe index portfolio.
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The key intuition is that the deviations from the truth (eithr due to biases or incomplete
information) are detrimental to the expected ex-post welfar and their negative impact is am-
plified by the disagreement between active investors, whichmakes their consumption shares
more volatile. Therefore, although an active investor may hve a higher consumption growth
than an index portfolio in the long-run, it does not necessarily chieve a better expected ex-post
welfare due to an imperfect balance between speculation andrisk-sharing. Moreover, we show
that a higher risk aversion works in favor of the index investor ince it increases the concavity
of the utility function, although it also reduces the consumption share volatility, the first effect
tends to dominate. The magnitude of the welfare improvementalso increases with higher risk
aversion. Furthermore, a more volatile index portfolio reduces the magnitude of the welfare
improvement.
Admittedly, our model is stylized and can be extended in several ways. In a recent theoret-
ical paper, Chabakauri and Rytchkov (2014) constrain one group of agents to only investing
in an index portfolio and the risk-free security and study the implication on asset prices in a
general equilibrium model. In our model, index portfolio cannot be combined with lending or
borrowing, thus do not affect equilibrium prices. It would be interesting to look at whether
investing in the risk-free security helps to further improve the expected ex-post welfare of in-
dex investors. More broadly, one can examine the welfare improving potential for any fixed
portfolio-consumption strategies. However, in those cases th proportion of investors adopting
the index or fixed strategies will affect market equilibrium, the feedback effect will complicate
the welfare analysis. The switch to an index portfolio may also be triggered by the cost of active
investing or social interaction. Moreover, institutionaland retail investors can be modelled dif-
ferently, for example, the former may care about their performance relative to a certain bench-
mark (Basak and Pavlova 2013). Furthermore, one can also consider the impact of portfolio
delegation and interaction between principals (investors) and agents (fund managers) on market
equilibrium and investors’ welfare (Vayanos and Woolley 2013, Buffa, Vayanos and Woolley
2014). Lastly, our model and many other differences-in-opinion models converge to a single-
agent economy in the long run. Therefore, in order to have a stationary market equilibrium,
one could consider an overlapping generations model (Ehling, Graniero and Heyerdahl-Larson
2014), recursive preferences (Borovicka 2015) or market frictions (Chabakauri and Han 2016).
We leave these extensions for future research.
INDEX PORTFOLIO AND WELFARE ANALYSIS 35
APPENDIX A. PROOFS






















However, the aggregate dividendD(t) is the optimal consumption for the representative agent with the








































































which simplifies to condition (S1).
In the case of‖θA‖ = ‖θB‖, from (16), η(t) and η(t)−1 have the same probability distribution.












































and the same holds for investorB. Hence,UA < UI .










an equivalent problem to computing (25) is to compute
τ = E0[inf{t : at+ Zt = l∗}], (59)
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This is a well studied problem, see Karatzas and Shreve (1991) Chapter 3.5, and the explicit density
function ofτl is given by









dt, t > 0.












The explicit solution of (60) depends on the sign ofa andl∗. Sincea andl∗ are both positive, the integral





Substituting in the values fora andl∗ completes the proof.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3.1. We first prove that investorsA andB have the same initial consumption.














































































Therefore, sinceA andB agree on the aggregate consumption process,θA1 = θ
B
1 = θ1, we have
WA(0) = WB(0) if and only if xA = xB = 12 , which implies thatλA(0) = λB(0).




1 = θ1 andWA(0) = WB(0), the expected instanta-





















LetX(t) ≡ (∆θ)⊤Z(t) andY (t) ≡ σ1Z1(t). SinceX(t) andY (t) are bivariate normal withE[X(t)] =
E[Y (t)] = 0, V ar[X(t)] = ‖∆θ‖2t, V ar[Y (t)] = σ21t andCorrel[X(t), Y (t)] = ∆θ1‖∆θ‖ . Therefore,
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the conditional distribution ofY (t) is given by













When∆θ1 = 0, from Equation (62),Y (t) is independent ofX(t), thusD1(t) is independent ofη(t).
This completes the proof.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let f(x) = xγ−1. Sincef
′′









< 0, 1 < γ < 2;
= 0, γ = 2;
> 0, 0 < γ < 1 or γ > 2.
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= 0, γ = 2;








































when 0 < γ < 2.
Also ‖θB‖2 − ‖θA‖2 > 1γ ‖∆θ‖2 is a necessary and sufficient condition whenγ = 2 and a necessary




(1 + γ)ϑ2 − ρϑ− 1
2
(γ − 1) ≤ 0, (63)





1− ρ2, L = R = ρ/(1 + γ). Since the quadratic in (41) is convex, the inequality holds
whenL ≤ ϑ ≤ R.
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